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On August 1, 1914, as dreadful struggle was breaking out in Europe, the German ambassador Prince Lichnowsky paid a go to to Britain’s International Secretary Sir Edward Gray. Dr Rudolf Steiner commented as follows upon this assembly – in a 1916 lecture which he gave in Switzerland:
‘A single sentence and the struggle within the West wouldn’t have taken place.’
At that assembly, he averred that, with only one sentence, ‘this struggle might have been averted.’[1]
To look at that outrageous-sounding declare, we delve into what’s a little bit of a thriller, that of the primary battle between Germany and Britain for a thousand years: two nations certain by the identical royal household, with each statesman in Europe loudly proclaiming that peace is desired, that struggle should in any respect prices be prevented; after which the massacre takes place, terminating the nice hopes for European civilization and extinguishing its vibrant optimism, as what have been arrange as defensive alliances mysteriously flipped over and have become offensive war-plans.
The ghastly ‘Schlieffen plan’ turned activated, because the master-plan of Germany’s self-defense, which because it have been contained the necessity for the dreadful velocity with which disaster was precipitated. France and Russia had fashioned a mutual protection settlement (everybody claimed their army alliances have been defensive). Whereas Bismarck the sensible statesman who based Germany had lived, this was prevented, such an alliance being his darkest nightmare. However Kaiser Wilhelm didn’t handle to keep away from this, and so Germany’s neighbors to East and West fashioned a mutual army alliance. The Schlieffen plan was based mostly on the premise that Germany couldn’t battle a struggle on two fronts however may be capable of beat France rapidly; so within the occasion of struggle looming towards Russia within the East, its troops needed to transfer westwards, crashing although Belgium as a route into France. All of it needed to occur rapidly as a result of Germany’s military was smaller than that of Russia.
The timing over these essential days reveals its terrible velocity: Russia mobilized its military on July twenty ninth, in response to hostilities breaking out between Austro-Hungary and Serbia; two determined cables have been despatched by the Kaiser to the Tsar on the twenty ninth and Thirty first, imploring him to not proceed with full mobilisation of his military as a result of that meant struggle; the French authorities ‘irreversibly determined’ to help Russia within the struggle on the night of Thirty first, cabling this choice to the Russian overseas minister at 1 am on August 1st[2]; then, on the afternoon of that very same day Germany proceeded to mobilise and declared struggle on Russia, and two days later went into Belgium. Britain’s Home of Commons voted unanimously for struggle on fifth August, viewing Germany because the belligerent warmonger.
Kaiser Wilhelm’s Nemesis
The Kaiser had loved the repute of a peacemaker:
Now … he’s acclaimed in every single place as the best issue for peace that our time can present. It was he, we hear, who repeatedly threw the burden of his dominating character, backed by the best army organisation on this planet – an organisation constructed up by himself – into the steadiness for peace wherever struggle clouds gathered over Europe. ‘(‘William II, King of Prussia and German Emperor, Kaiser 25 years a ruler, hailed as chief peacemaker,’ New York Instances, 8 June, 1913.[3])
A former US President, William Howard Taft, mentioned of him: ‘The reality of historical past requires the decision that, contemplating the critically vital half which has been his among the many nations, he has been, for the final quarter of a century, the only best pressure within the sensible upkeep of peace on this planet.’ ([4],[5]). That’s some tribute! In 1960 a BBC centenary tribute to the Kaiser was permitted to say: ‘Emphasis was positioned on his love of England and his deep attachment to Queen Victoria,’ his grandmother.
A lover of peace …. expert diplomat … deep attachment to Queen Victoria .. so remind me what the Nice Conflict was for, that took 9 million lives?
May the struggle have been averted if the Kaiser had, maybe, focussed a bit extra on the artwork of struggle – how one can chorus from marching into Belgium? There was no ‘plan B’! In later days the Kaiser used to say, he had been swept away by the army timetable. Who wishedthe struggle which locked Europe into such dreadful battle? Did a mere sequence of interlocking treaties deliver it on?
On the evening of 30-Thirty first of July, feeling entrapped by a seemingly inevitable march of occasions, Kaiser Wilhelm mused to himself doomily:
Frivolity and weak point are going to plunge the world into probably the most frightful struggle of which the final word object is the overthrow of Germany. For I now not have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed amongst themselves – understanding that our treaty obligations compel us to help Austria – to make use of the Austro-Serb battle as a pretext for waging a struggle of annihilation towards us… On this manner the stupidity and clumsiness of our ally [Austria] is was a noose. So the celebrated encirclement of Germany has lastly develop into an accepted truth… The online has instantly been closed over our heads, and the purely anti-German coverage which England has been scornfully pursuing all around the world has received probably the most spectacular victory which now we have proved ourselves powerless to stop whereas they, having obtained us regardless of our struggles on their own into the web by means of our loyalty to Austria, proceed to throttle our political and financial existence. An impressive achievement, which even these for whom it means catastrophe are certain to admire.’[6]
‘These dreadful fields of mindless carnage’
Did lots of of hundreds of younger males, the flower of England, need to exit to muddy fields, to battle and die? Shells, bayonets, gasoline, machine weapons – what was the purpose? On no account have been they defending their nation or its Empire – for no-one was threatening it. No European nation benefitted: it spelt wreck for all of them. Do we have to concern the imbecility of the poet’s phrases:
If I ought to die, assume solely this of me
There’s some nook of a overseas discipline
That’s without end England’? (Rupert Brooke)
A number one British pacifist, E.D. Morel, was broadly vilified for the views expressed in his guide Reality and the Conflict (1916), and had his well being wrecked (as Bertrand Russell described) by being put into Pentonville jail. In haunting phrases of perception, his guide described how: ‘These dreadful fields of mindless carnage’ had been led to by ‘futile and depraved Statecraft’ – by ‘an autocratic and secret overseas coverage’ carried out by these ‘who by secret plots and counter-plots … hound the peoples to mutual destruction.’ Of the struggle’s outbreak, Morel wrote: ‘It got here due to this fact to this. Whereas destructive assurances had been given to the Home of Commons, optimistic acts diametrically opposed to those assurances had been concerted by the Conflict Workplace and the Admiralty with the authority of the International Workplace. All of the obligations of an alliance had been incurred, however incurred by probably the most harmful and delicate strategies; incurred in such a manner as to go away the Cupboard free to disclaim the existence of any formal parchment recording them, and free to signify its coverage at house and overseas as one in all contractual detachment from the rival Continental teams.’[7] A complete analogy exists right here with Blair taking Britain into the Iraq struggle, making a take care of Bush whereas frequently denying again house that any such deal existed. Two Cupboard members resigned in August 1914, as soon as the central significance of this hid contract turned evident: Viscount Morley and John Burns.
A extra orthodox, deterministic view was given by Winston Churchill: ‘the invasion of Belgium introduced the British Empire united to the sphere. Nothing in human energy might break the deadly chain, as soon as it had begun to unroll. A scenario had been created the place lots of of officers had solely to do their prescribed obligation to their respective international locations to wreck the world. They did their obligation’.[8] That vital chain resulting in wreck started solely after the essential dialogue alluded to by Dr Steiner, we observe.
Contemplating that Germany went into Belgium on the third of August, whereas Churchill and Mountbatten, the First and Second Sea Lords, had ordered the mobilising of the British fleet over July 26 -Thirtieth, in order that by days earlier than the third a lot of the world’s largest navy was up north of Scotland all able to pounce on Germany – his phrases might seem as some sort of excessive restrict of hypocrisy. The mobilising of the British fleet was a large occasion which enormously pre-empted political dialogue, per week earlier than Britain declared struggle.[9],[10]
A Secret Alliance
Britain was obliged by no necessity to enter a European struggle, having no alliance with France that the individuals of Britain or its parliament knew about, and having a protracted certainly regular coverage of avoiding embroilment in European conflicts. Nevertheless, ministers particularly Gray the International Minister had covertly made a take care of France. To cite from Bertrand Russell’s autobiography: ‘I had observed throughout earlier years how rigorously Sir Edward Gray lied with a view to forestall the general public from understanding the strategies by which he was committing us to the help of France within the occasion of struggle.’[11] Would Britain be dragged right into a European struggle on the coat-tails of France – for hundreds of years, its conventional enemy – provided that France had signed a treaty obligation to enter struggle in consequence of a German-Russian battle? France was eager to avenge previous grievances over the French-German border, conscious of the prevalence of troops which it and Russia mixed had towards Germany – and satisfied that it might drag Britain into the fray.
On 24 March 1913, the Prime Minister had been requested in regards to the circumstances beneath which British troops may land on the Continent. He replied, ‘As has been repeatedly acknowledged, this nation isn’t beneath any obligation not public and recognized to parliament which compels it to participate in any struggle’ – a double destructive which hid a hidden however then-existing accord!
Final Hope of Peace
We flip now to the query put, on August 1st by Germany’s ambassador to Britain’s International Secretary, usually omitted from historical past books on the topic. If struggle and peace did certainly hinge upon it – as Dr Steiner averred – it could be value quoting a number of judgements about it. Right here is Gray’s personal letter, written that day:
Gray’s letter to the British ambassador in Berlin: 1 August, regarding his assembly with Prince Lichnowsky:
‘He requested me whether or not, if Germany gave a promise to not violate Belgian neutrality we’d have interaction to stay impartial. I replied that I couldn’t say that: our arms have been nonetheless free, and we have been contemplating what our perspective needs to be….I didn’t assume that we might give a promise on that situation alone. The ambassador pressed me as as to if I might formulate circumstances on which we’d stay impartial. He even advised that the integrity of France and her colonies may be assured. I mentioned that I felt obliged to refuse undoubtedly any promise to stay impartial on related phrases, and I might solely say that we should preserve our arms free.’[12],[13]
Swiss creator George Brandes summarised this assembly:
‘Now Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, requested whether or not England would agree to stay impartial if Germany shunned violating Belgium’s neutrality. Sir Edward Gray refused. Britain wished to retain ‘a free hand’ (‘I didn’t assume we might give a promise of neutrality on that situation alone’). Would he agree if Germany have been to ensure the integrity of each France and her colonies? No.’[14]
The US historian Harry Elmer Barnes: ‘The one manner whereby Gray might have prevented struggle, if in any respect, in 1914 would have been by declaring that England would stay impartial if Germany didn’t invade Belgium…,’ however Gray ‘refused to do’ this: ‘After Gray had refused to vow the German Ambassador that England would stay impartial within the occasion of Germany’s agreeing to not invade Belgium, the German ambassador requested Gray to formulate the circumstances in keeping with which England would stay impartial, however Gray refused point-blank to take action, although he afterwards falsely knowledgeable the Commons that he had acknowledged these circumstances’.[15] Barnes counseled the editorial of the Manchester Guardian July Thirtieth – opposing the pro-war jingoism of The Instances – which declared: ‘not solely are we impartial now, however we’re and ought to stay impartial all through the entire course of the struggle.’
The British decide and lawyer Robert Reid was the Earl of Loreburn in addition to the Lord Chancellor of England from 1905 to 1912, so he ought to know what was occurring. His guide ‘How the Conflict Got here’ described the way it was the secret take care of France which wrecked every thing:
The ultimate mistake was that when, on the precise disaster arising, a call come what may may and, as far as will be judged, would have averted the Continental struggle altogether … The mischief is that Sir Edward Gray slipped into a brand new coverage, however with out both Military, or treaty, or warrant of Parliamentary approval … This nation has a proper to know its personal obligations and put together to satisfy them and to resolve its personal destinies. When probably the most momentous choice of our entire historical past needed to be taken we weren’t free to resolve. We entered a struggle to which we had been dedicated beforehand at the hours of darkness, and Parliament discovered itself at two hours’ discover unable, had it desired, to extricate us from this fearful predicament… If the federal government thought that both our honour or our security did require us to intervene on behalf of France, then they should have mentioned so unequivocally earlier than the indignant Powers on the Continent dedicated themselves to irrevocable steps within the perception that we must always stay impartial. As an alternative of claiming both, they saved on saying within the despatches that their arms have been completely free, and informed the Commons the identical factor. The paperwork present conclusively that until after Germany declared struggle our Ministers had not made up their minds on both of the 2 questions, whether or not or not they might battle for France, and whether or not or not they might battle for Belgium. In fact Belgium was merely a hall into France, and until France was attacked Belgium was in no hazard.[16]
After it was over, US President Woodrow Wilson in March of 1919 summed up its avoidability: ‘We all know for a certainty that if Germany had thought for a second that Nice Britain would go in with France and Russia, she would by no means have undertaken the enterprise.’ (p.18, Lorenburn). That was the sense wherein Britain precipitated the dreadful battle. Clear phrases of fact might have prevented it – had that been desired.
We remind ourselves of Dr Steiner’s comparability: that the British Empire then coated one-quarter of the Earth’s land-surface; Russia one-seventh; France and her colonies one-thirteenth; and Germany, one thirty-third. (Karma, p.11)
Upon receiving a telegram from Prince Lichnowsky earlier within the day of August 1, the Kaiser ordered a bottle of champagne to have a good time, as if there may be hope of reaching a take care of Britain. Although he was simply that afternoon signing the order for mobilisation of the German military, he might in some extent have recalled it … however, it was a false hope, and a telegram from King Edward later that day defined to him that there had been a ‘misunderstanding’ between Britain’s International Secretary and the German ambassador.[17]
Grey’s Duplicity
On the twenty sixth or twenty seventh, Gray informed the Cupboard that he must resign, if it didn’t help his initiative to take Britain into struggle in help of ‘our ally,’ France. He wouldn’t be capable of associate with British neutrality. Over as of late up till the first, or 2nd, when the struggle was simply beginning, all of the Cupboard of Britain’s Liberal Get together authorities aside from Churchill and Gray favoured British neutrality. It was these two who dragged Britain into struggle. Gray didn’t but know whether or not the Belgian authorities would say ‘no’ to the German request to be allowed to move by means of. To get his struggle, Gray needed to swing it on the ‘poor little Belgium’ angle. As soon as Belgium had mentioned ‘No’ and but Germany nonetheless went in – as its solely approach to enter France – a cupboard majority would then turned assured.
On August 2nd, Gray gave to the French ambassador what amounted to British assurance of war-support. On August third, Gray gave the Commons an impassioned plea in favour of British intervention on behalf of France – making no point out of the German peace-offer. The MP Phillip Morrell spoke afterwards within the sole anti-war speech that day, and identified {that a} assure by Germany to not invade France had been provided, on situation of British neutrality, and spurned. As to why Gray didn’t point out the German supply, the view was later contrived that the German ambassador had merely been talking in a non-public capability![18]
The supposed neutrality of Belgium was a sham, as ministers of that nation had secretly drawn up detailed anti-German war-plans with Britain and France. No marvel the Kaiser had a way of being ‘encircled’ by enemies, as a result of ‘“impartial” Belgium had in actuality develop into an energetic member of the coalition concluded towards Germany’[19] – i.e. it had plotted towards a pleasant nation. Quoting the commendably insightful George Bernard Shaw, ‘The violation of Belgian neutrality by the Germans was the mainstay of our righteousness; and we performed it off on America for way more than it was value. I guessed that when the German account of our dealings with Belgium reached the United states of america, backed with an array of facsimiles of secret diplomatic paperwork found by them in Brussels, it could be discovered that our personal therapy of Belgium was as little suitable with neutrality because the German invasion.’[20]
Steiner’s View
Rudolf Steiner’s judgement in his December 1916 lecture (throughout which Britain was declining a peace supply from Germany) was:
‘Let me merely comment, that sure issues occurred from which the one smart conclusion to be drawn later turned out to be the proper one, specifically that behind those that have been in a manner the puppets there stood in England a robust and influential group of people that pushed issues doggedly in the direction of a struggle with Germany and thru whom the way in which was paved for the world struggle that had all the time been prophesied. For in fact the way in which will be paved for what it’s supposed ought to occur. ..it’s unimaginable to keep away from realising how highly effective was the group who like an outpost of mighty impulses, stood behind the puppets within the foreground. These latter are in fact, completely sincere individuals, but they’re puppets, and now they’ll vanish into obscurity ….[21]
Gray and Churchill have been the 2 constantly pro-war cupboard ministers. The Conservative Get together was solidly pro-war, and Churchill was prepared to supply them a deal if perchance too most of the Liberal-party cupboard have been going to resign somewhat than go to struggle. Steiner right here remarked:
‘Anybody [in England] voicing the true causes [for war] would have been swept away by public opinion. One thing fairly totally different was wanted – a purpose which the English individuals might settle for, and that was the violation of Belgian neutrality. However this primary needed to be led to. It’s actually true that Sir Edward Gray might have prevented it with a single sentence. Historical past will in the future present that the neutrality of Belgium would by no means have been violated if Sir Edward Gray had made the declaration which it could have been fairly straightforward for him to make, if he had been ready to observe his personal inclination. However since he was unable to observe his personal inclination however needed to obey an impulse which got here from one other aspect, he needed to make the declaration which made it vital for the neutrality of Belgium to be violated. Georg Brandes pointed to this. By this act England was offered with a believable purpose. That had been the entire level of the train: to current England with a believable purpose! To the individuals who mattered, nothing would have been extra uncomfortable than the non-violation of Belgian territory!’[22]
May powers behind Gray have wished struggle, and steered occasions in the direction of that finish? Steiner argued towards the widespread view of an inevitable slide into struggle: ‘You haven’t any thought how excessively irresponsible it’s to hunt a easy continuity in these occasions, thus believing that with out extra ado the Nice World Conflict happened, or needed to come about, because of Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia. (p.82)
We’re right here reminded of Morel’s account, of how secret plotting had paralysed debate:
‘The nemesis of their very own secret acts gripped our ministers by the throat. It paralysed their honest and determined efforts to take care of peace. It forged dissention amongst them…They might not afford to be sincere neither to the British individuals nor to the world. They might not maintain in test the weather making for struggle in Germany by a well timed declaration of solidarity with France and Russia, though morally dedicated to France.. In useless the Russians and the French implored them to make a pronouncement of British coverage whereas there was nonetheless time.’[23]
On August 4th, Britain declared struggle, and that similar evening reduce by means of the transatlantic undersea phone cables popping out of Germany,[24] enabling British atrocity propaganda to work largely unchallenged. Quoting a latest work on the topic, ‘The hallmark of Britain’s profitable propaganda efforts have been alleged German atrocities of gigantic proportions that strongly influenced naive People craving for a chivalrous struggle from afar’.[25]
Such constant, intentional lying was pretty progressive, which was why it labored so effectively: ‘In that struggle, hatred propaganda was for the primary time given one thing like organised consideration’.[26] Thus, a nemesis of what Morel described as ‘futile and depraved statecraft’ right here appeared, in that British troopers have been motivated to battle, by a nonstop torrent of lies – from their very own authorities.[27]
In conclusion, can we agree with Dr Steiner? Quoting Barnes, ‘It’s thus obvious that the accountability for the deadly Russian mobilisation which produced the struggle have to be shared collectively, and possibly about equally, by France and Russia.’ This was due to the French cupboard’s basic encouragement, then its ultimate choice to embark upon struggle on the twenty ninth July, of which Barnes remarked: ‘The key convention of Poincaré, Viviani and Messimy, in session with Izvolski, on the evening of twenty ninth of July, marks the second when the horrors of struggle have been particularly unchained in Europe.’ (pp.328, 242) This needed to be the time, it was the one alternative, as a result of these war-plotters would have recognized of the mobilisation of the world’s largest navy, that of Nice Britain, over these fateful days, all prepared for struggle. The Russian generals browbeat the Tzar into signing the paperwork giving his assent – for a struggle he didn’t need[28]. On the Thirty first another determined telegram arrived from the Kaiser about how ‘The peace of Europe should still be maintained’ if solely Russia would cease its mobilisation, however the Tzar now not had that skill. Germany positioned itself at a army drawback by refraining from declaring struggle or taking steps to mobilise till the afternoon of August 1st, a lot later than any of the opposite nice powers concerned. Had a deal been reached in London on that afternoon, a battle in Jap Europe would presumably nonetheless have taken place, however it could have been restricted and diplomats might have handled it: sure, a world struggle might have been averted.
Important texts
- Alexander Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium, NY 1915
- E.D. Morel, Reality and the Conflict, 1916
- The Earl Lorenburn, How the Conflict Got here, 1919
- Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World Conflict an Introduction to the Drawback of Conflict Guilt, 1926
- British paperwork on the origins of the struggle 1898-1914, Vol XI, HMSO 1926.
- Memorandum on Resignation by John Viscount, Morley, 1928, 39pp.
- Alfred von Wegerer, A Refutation of the Versailles Conflict Guilt Thesis, 1930
- Winston Churchill, The Nice Conflict Vol. 1, 1933
- Captain Russell Grenfell, Unconditional Hatred, German Conflict Guilt and the Way forward for Europe(primarily about WW2) NY, 1954
- M. Balfour, The Kaiser and His Instances, 1964
- Stewart Halsey Ross, Propaganda for Conflict, How the USA Was Conditioned to Struggle the Nice Conflict of 1914-18, 2009.
Notes
[1] Rudolf Steiner, The Karma of Untruthfulness Vol. 1 (13 lectures at Dornach, Switzerland, 4-Thirty first December 1916), 1988, p.19. NB it’s out there on-line as a Google-book, with the identical pagination as right here used. The brand new 2005 version (subtitled Secret Societies, the Media, and Preparations for the Nice Conflict) has a fantastic Introduction by Terry Boardman.
[2] Barnes 1926, pp.284-8.
[3] Balfour, 1964, p.351.
[4] Ross, 2009, p.9. For a letter by US diplomat and presidential advisor Colonel E.Home, regarding the pacific philosophy of the Kaiser, after a go to he paid in July 1914, see Barnes, p.523. For the ex-Kaiser’s view on ‘proof of Germany’s peaceable intentions’ i.e. how Germany had not ready for struggle or anticipated it, see: My Memoirs, 1878-1918 by Ex-Kaiser William II, 1992, Ch.10 ‘The Outbreak of Conflict.’
[5] Morel, p.122: Germany had ‘for forty and 4 years saved the peace when struggle broke out in August … No different Nice Energy can boast such a report.’ (Morel’s guide could also be considered on-line)
[6] Balfour, 1964, p.354
[7] Morel, 1916, pp.6, 8, 13 and 42.
[8] Churchill, 1933, Vol. 1, p.107.
[9] Churchill, ibid., has the British fleet secretly mobilised over the evening of 29-Thirtieth July. Hugh Martin, in Battle, the Life-story of the Rt Hon. Winston Churchill, 1937: ‘Churchill, upon his personal accountability and towards the specific choice of the Cupboard, ordered the mobilisation of the Naval Reserve’ On the twenty seventh, ‘the fleet [was] despatched North to stop the potential of it being bottled up,’ p.105. A ‘Check Mobilisation’ of all the Royal Navy paraded earlier than the King on July twenty sixth, at Spitalhead, after which the Navy was held full battle-readiness (The Life and Instances of Lord Mountbatten, John Terrence 1968, p11-14); then, ‘On July twenty ninth Churchill secretly ordered the core of the fleet to maneuver north to its protected wartime base .. using at prime velocity and with its lights out, it tore by means of the evening up the North sea.’ (To Finish All Wars, How WW1 Divided Britain, 2011, Adam Hochschild, p.85).
[10] The primary indication for the Kaiser of war-imminence, was when he realized that the English fleet ‘had not dispersed after the assessment at Spitalhead however had remained concentrated.’ (My Memoirs, p.241).
[11] Bertrand Russell, Autobiography, Vol. 1, 1967, p.239. H.G. Wells judged that: ‘I believe he (Grey) wished the struggle and I believe he wished it to return when it did … The cost is, that he didn’t undoubtedly warn Germany, that we must always actually come into the struggle, that he was sufficiently ambiguous to let her take a danger and assault, and that he did this intentionally. I believe that this cost is sound.’ (Experiment in an Autobiography, II, 1934, p.770)
[12] Edward Gray letter Aug 1st: Britain’s ‘Blue Guide,’ HMSO, 1926, p.261. See additionally Morley 1928, p.38-9.
[13] The noncommittal perspective expressed by Gray on August 1st to the German ambassador had been endorsed by the Cupboard and Prime Minister: Roy Jenkins, Asquith 1964, p.363.
[14] Steiner, Karma, p.18: Georg Brandes, Farbenblinde Neutralität, Zurich 1916 (Brandes was Danish). Steiner quotes extensively from it, Karma, pp. 14-23.
[15] Barnes, 1926, p.497.
[16] Loreburn, 1919, pp.15-19.
[17] Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World Conflict2001 CUP p.219-223: Lichinowsky’s telegram misunderstood (NB I’m not endorsing her thesis of German war-guilt).
[18] Gray informed cupboard about discuss with Lichinowsky on third, with a declare that the latter’s views have been ‘merely private and unauthorised.’ (Morley, pp.13-14) If that’s the case, why was the dialog recorded and revealed in Britain’s ‘White Guide’ of key wartime paperwork? How might a German Ambassador make a merely private proposal? Different such ‘White Guide’ paperwork have been recorded as private, however not this one. As Morel identified (pp.26-7), the UK’s ‘Blue Guide’ revealed its account of this interview with no trace that the Ambassador was merely appearing privately – and Lichinowsky’s telegram to his Authorities dated 8.30 pm, August 1, indicated that he had been appearing on ‘directions.’ His supply was usually concordant with telegrams then being despatched by the Kaiser and German Minister of International Affairs. (Morel, p.26)
[19] Fuehr, 1915, pp.90, 117. (For feedback on Fuehr see Ross 2009, pp.116-7: Fuehr’s account was ‘actually biased’ however ‘well-documented.’) For the incriminating paperwork, see Ross p.300, be aware 55. The Kaiser recalled how piles of British army-coats and maps of Belgium have been discovered hid across the Belgian border, in anticipation of the struggle: My Memoirs, p.251-2.
[20] Ross, 2009, p.42.
[21] Steiner, Karma, pp.84-5.
[22] Ibid, p.86.
[23] Morel 1916, p.297.
[24] Ross, 2009, pp.15, 27.
[25] Ibid, p.3.
[26] Grenfell, 1954, p.125.
[27] Likewise from the French authorities: Barnes, …For a basic remark see Georges Thiel, Heresy: ‘One grows dizzy on the itemizing of all these lies [against Germany] which, afterwards, have been demolished one after the opposite.’ Historic Overview Press, 2006, p.31.
[28] For the Ex-Kaiser’s account of how, as he later realized, his telegrams significantly affected Tzar Nicholas in these essential days, see: My Memoirs, Ch.10.
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