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Whereas Russia’s warfare in Ukraine stays on the forefront of worldwide consideration as essentially the most extreme geopolitical disaster on this planet at this time, the decade-old, internationalized battle in Syria should have new surprises to supply. As the specter of a brand new Turkish army incursion into northern Syria looms, different worldwide stakeholders within the Syrian disaster proceed to voice their issues over Ankara’s ambitions. At odds with Turkey since 2011 over its want to overthrow the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its help for an array of armed opposition factions, Iran has been more and more vocal of late in opposing a possible new Turkish army operation.
When requested about Turkey’s army actions in northern Syria and Iraq, Iranian International Ministry Spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh stated on June 20 that, “The Syria file is a matter of dispute between us and Turkey.” In response to him, in “detailed bilateral conferences” with the Turkish facet, Iran has made it clear that its “primary and clear purpose” is to protect Syria’s territorial integrity. In the identical vein, Ali Asghar Khaji, a senior Iranian diplomat who headed Iran’s delegation on the 18th spherical of the Astana talks on Syria, stated at a gathering with the Turkish delegation on June 16 that, “Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are untouchable.” Most not too long ago, throughout his go to to Ankara on June 27, International Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian stated that though “Iran understands Turkey’s safety issues” in Syria, such issues must be addressed by way of “dialogue and peaceable means.”
In the meantime, in preparation for a possible Turkish incursion, Iran has reportedly sought to facilitate coordination between its allied forces in Syria, models of the Syrian military, and Kurdish militias in northern Syria. These diplomatic and army developments have sparked hypothesis about the potential of tensions and even confrontation between Turkish and Iranian forces in Syria. In reality, throughout the latest spherical of Turkish army operations in northern Syria in early 2020, the 2 sides got here to the brink of a confrontation. Though a army face-off was ultimately averted — primarily because of Russia’s function in reaching a cease-fire cope with Turkey — there is no such thing as a assure of a repeat. A collection of latest developments in Syria and past has elevated Tehran’s menace notion of Ankara and should set off a army response, albeit an oblique one, to a brand new Turkish operation.
Iran’s issues in Syria
Because the starting of the Syrian battle, Turkey has performed 4 main army operations in northern Syria. The primary operation, Euphrates Protect, was carried out in northern Aleppo in August 2016, throughout which Turkish-backed forces took management of two,055 sq. kilometers of that space. Operation Olive Department in January 2018 allowed Turkey to seize all the Afrin District. In late 2019, Operation Peace Spring expanded the areas underneath the management of Turkish and allied forces east of the Euphrates. A subsequent operation within the northwestern governorate of Idlib in February 2020, referred to as Spring Protect, additional strengthened Turkey’s maintain over Syria’s northern strip.
Turkish officers have constantly said that the aim of their army operations is to counter the “terrorist menace” in northern Syria, emphasizing significantly the pressing have to confront the Kurdish militias of the Individuals’s Safety Models (YPG). To Ankara, the YPG is the Syrian offshoot of the outlawed Kurdistan Employees’ Social gathering (PKK), which has been combating with the Turkish authorities for many years. However, because of these operations, Turkey and its affiliated forces are actually accountable for about 10% of Syrian territory. Now, Turkish officers, together with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, insist that a rise in terrorist threats stemming from Syria has necessitated a brand new operation. In response to Turkish officers, the aim of the operation is to create a 30 kilometer deep “secure zone” on Syrian soil, so as to purge the “terrorists” and pave the best way for the repatriation of greater than 1 million Syrian refugees. Up to now no less than two cities, Manbij and Tel Rifaat, have been cited as main targets of Turkey’s forthcoming army operation, but there has additionally been hypothesis that Kobani and Ayn Issa may very well be concerned as properly.
Manbij and Kobani, in addition to virtually all areas east of the Euphrates, have been outdoors Iran’s zone of affect and curiosity in Syria. Because of this, a Turkish operation in these areas won’t provoke a response from Iran, because it has not previously. In reality, Kurdish militias east of the Euphrates, performing underneath the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), are thought-about allies of america in Syria. From this angle, any transfer by Turkey that might probably restrict the geographical scope of U.S. affect in Syria can be welcomed by Iran. However on the subject of Tel Rifaat, issues look fairly completely different.
Situated within the north of Aleppo Governorate, Tel Rifaat is now besieged by Turkey (and its native proxies) from the north, east, and west. However south of Tel Rifaat is the place the 2 Shiite cities of Nubl and al-Zahra are situated; these settlements are located between Tel Rifaat and Aleppo metropolis. Thus, the area is significant to Iran and its allies in Syria, each ideologically and strategically. From an ideological perspective, Iran is anxious that the subsequent step for Ankara-backed Sunni militias after taking management of Tel Rifaat can be to focus on the Shiites of Nubl and al-Zahra. Strategically, Tehran believes that taking management of Tel Rifaat can be a prelude to Turkey and its allies marching towards Aleppo metropolis. Because the Syrian military recaptured Aleppo in 2016, town has seen a substantial enhance within the affect of Iran and its affiliated teams. From a broader perspective, there’s a concern in Iran that if Ankara succeeds in establishing its long-desired 30-kilometer secure zone, it’ll launch a brand new push to overthrow the Assad regime. Iran’s Strategic Council on International Relations (SCFR) argues in an evaluation that, “Turkey seeks to extend stress on the Assad authorities and pave the best way for a change in central and southern Syria,” which runs counter to Iran’s pursuits in these areas.
Concerns past Syria
Other than the potential geographical scope of Turkey’s new operation, there are different components making Tehran extra involved than ever about Ankara’s plans in Syria. These components are primarily associated to latest developments in Turkish international and regional coverage, with the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement on the high of the listing. The SCFR warns that, “Supporting anti-Assad forces is a joint Turkish-Israeli challenge, which was agreed upon throughout [Turkish Foreign Minister] Cavusoglu’s latest go to to Tel Aviv.” It additionally argues that the “challenge” might be applied if Turkey’s main purpose of “finishing the safety hall in northern Syria” is met. In the identical vein, the semi-official ILNA information company quotes Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a former member of Iran’s parliament, as saying that, “Israel is investing in Turkey’s affect in Syria.” Israel’s purpose, in keeping with him, is to create instability in Syria to maintain Tehran busy.
In reality, Iranian leaders have good motive to consider that Turkey and Israel are forming a typical entrance towards Iran. On June 23, shortly earlier than then Israeli International Minister Yair Lapid visited Turkey, it was introduced that Turkish safety forces had foiled an Iranian plot to assassinate Israeli vacationers, an accusation that Iran dismissed as “ridiculous.” What strengthens Iran’s suspicion of an anti-Iranian agenda in Ankara’s international coverage is that Turkey has additionally been creating relations with Iran’s different regional rivals, together with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s go to to Turkey on June 22 obtained widespread consideration in Iran. Certainly one of Iran’s issues is that Turkey’s quest for Saudi funding to enhance its ailing economic system could lead on Ankara to rethink its ties with Tehran so as to please Riyadh. Moreover, the potential for a extra energetic Turkish function in Yemen towards the Iran-backed Houthis is especially worrying for Tehran.
Turkey’s evolving function in Iraq is one other challenge that has negatively affected Iran’s view of Turkey. Turkish army intervention in northern Iraq, geared toward countering the specter of Kurdish insurgency, is nothing new. However over the previous two years, Turkey’s function has taken on new dimensions which might be of concern to Iran. The 2020 trilateral settlement between Ankara, Baghdad, and the Kurdistan Regional Authorities (KRG) in Erbil to purge the PKK in Sinjar was a milestone in that regard, as Iran felt successfully excluded from safety preparations in northern Iraq. Since then, pro-Iran Shiite teams have repeatedly accused Turkey of meddling in Iraq, warning that they may take army motion towards Turkish forces. Turkey’s efforts to extend its affect amongst Iraq’s Kurdish and Sunni political factions, particularly after the November 2021 parliamentary elections, have made Iran petrified of decreasing its conventional affect in Iraqi politics.
As such, many in Iran have come to consider that the Turkish chief’s proclaimed purpose of “combating terrorism” is just an excuse to pursue an expansionist coverage within the Center East and past, which is able to in the end result in Turkey’s alignment with Iran’s enemies and additional exacerbate the conflicts of curiosity between Tehran and Ankara. Ali Akbar Farazi, a veteran diplomat who has served as Iran’s ambassador to Romania, Hungary, and Cyprus, believes that Turkey has outlined a “regional and world political and diplomatic sphere of affect” for itself within the context of its “neo-Ottoman” method. Due to this fact, Turkey’s army involvement in Syria and Iraq is geared toward realizing this sphere of affect. In response to Farazi, “The potential for a battle between the Turkish military and the Syrian military could be very severe, and consequently, a confrontation between Iranian and Turkish forces may additionally happen.”
Ought to we count on an Iran-Turkey battle in Syria?
Given the buildup of disputes and strengthening of tensions between Tehran and Ankara lately, Farazi’s concern about the potential of a battle between Iran and Turkey in Syria will not be solely unfounded. That stated, Tehran has good motive to keep away from a confrontation with Ankara. On the one hand, even a restricted direct army response from Iran in Syria may enhance tensions in bilateral relations to an unprecedented degree, pushing Ankara additional towards alignment with Israel and Saudi Arabia. The very last thing Iran needs to see is a solidified anti-Iran entrance within the Center East comprising all of its primary regional rivals. Then again, such a transfer would probably result in the collapse of the Astana course of. Certainly, the Astana observe has largely misplaced its sensible operate over the previous two years, turning right into a symbolic format. Nevertheless, the mere symbolic operate is sort of essential for Tehran, because it’s the one worldwide diplomatic framework wherein the nation has had an energetic function. On this sense, Iran has considered the Astana course of as a way of legitimizing its involvement in Syria.
Contemplating these dangers and limitations, Iran has already launched into a set of political and army strikes in Syria, albeit not directly, to counter the specter of a brand new Turkish operation. On the political degree, Iran hopes to push the Kurds towards an settlement with Damascus that might entail the Kurdish militants handing over management of Tel Rifaat to the Syrian military earlier than a Turkish incursion takes place. This is able to deprive Ankara of its chief excuse for together with Tel Rifaat in its new Syria operation, i.e., to battle towards the Kurdish insurgency. On the similar time, Iran has sought to steer Russia, which seems to be much less enthusiastic about energetic army involvement in Syria as a result of its preoccupation with the Ukraine warfare, to play a extra energetic function in deterring Turkey from a large-scale operation. Iran’s semi-official Mehr Information Company mentions this side of the Iranian method, suggesting that, “If the Kurds conform to cooperate with the Syrian and Iranian armies, no less than in Tel Rifaat, in such a means as to achieve their help or appeal to extra Russian consideration, the calculations of the Turkish military will change to some extent.” In that case, Iran may really kill two birds with one stone, i.e. forestall a Turkish assault on Tel Rifaat whereas — maybe extra importantly — utilizing the SDF’s vulnerability towards Turkey as a instrument to weaken U.S. affect in Syria. In different phrases, on the subject of the Syrian Kurds, Iran’s concerns transcend the function of Turkey and have extra do with easy methods to undermine the alliance between the Kurdish militias and Washington.
Iranian efforts in such a course in alignment with the Assad regime have already borne some fruit. On the one hand, the SDF introduced in an announcement on June 7 that its forces are prepared “to coordinate with forces of the Damascus authorities to confront any attainable Turkish incursion and to guard Syrian territories towards the occupation.” Though that is nonetheless removed from Iran’s desired purpose of Tel Rifaat being handed over to the Syrian military, it may very well be seen as a step ahead. Then again, plainly Russia, after preliminary hesitation, has determined to take a stricter stance towards Turkey’s plans for northern Syria. On June 15, forward of the most recent Astana assembly in Kazakhstan, Russia’s particular presidential envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, known as a possible new Turkish operation “illogical and irrational” whereas additionally dismissing any attainable “discount” with Ankara relating to Syria. The remarks got here just a few days after Russian forces performed aerial patrols round Tel Rifaat to consolidate their positions within the space.
However ought to all these strikes fail to discourage Turkey, Iran has additionally labored on army plans to confront Turkish forces or no less than restrict the scope of their operation. These plans embrace selling and facilitating cooperation between Iran-backed militias in Syria and Kurdish militants, in addition to sending reinforcements to those teams. Since early June, the Iranians have reportedly dispatched militia forces to Nubl and al-Zahra. The forces have been deployed to frontlines with Turkish forces and the Turkish-backed Syrian Nationwide Military in northern Aleppo and areas round Afrin. On the similar time, there have been experiences that Iran has established a joint operations room north of Aleppo consisting of its Syrian and non-Syrian proxies, YPG forces, and Lebanese Hezbollah. If true, this might be essentially the most complete army coordination between Iran-backed forces and Kurdish militias because the begin of the Syrian battle.
As such, if Turkey decides to hold out its plan to assault northern Syria, and if the operation extends to Tel Rifaat and northern Aleppo, Iran will likely resort to an oblique army response by way of proxy forces. Though this might be a much less dangerous possibility in comparison with the state of affairs of a direct Iranian-Turkish confrontation, there would nonetheless be a excessive probability that the scenario may spiral uncontrolled and result in a broader and longer-term battle between the 2 neighbors.
Hamidreza Azizi, Ph.D., is a CATS fellow on the German Institute for Worldwide and Safety Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. He was an assistant professor of regional research at Shahid Beheshti College (2016-20) and a visitor lecturer on the division of regional research on the College of Tehran (2016-18). The views expressed on this piece are his personal.
Picture by Anas Alkharboutli/image alliance by way of Getty Pictures
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