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Introduction
For the reason that 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia has been involved concerning the potential affect of Iran’s supreme chief amongst its Shi’a inhabitants, which includes round 10-15% of the majority-Sunni nation, particularly since Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei took on the title of Vali-ye faqih, or “guardian-jurist.” Such concern is comprehensible on condition that the 2 international locations are each neighbors and rivals: Khamenei is a marj’a, the highest-ranking Shi’a non secular authority, however he’s additionally the commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces. This concern over Iranian affect among the many Saudi Shi’a neighborhood reached its peak following the Khobar Towers bombing on June 25, 1996, a terrorist assault that focused members of america Air Power’s 4404th Wing (Provisional) stationed in Saudi Arabia’s Japanese Province, residence to a lot of the dominion’s Shi’a inhabitants.
This paper goals to analyze the Iranian affect throughout the Shi’a neighborhood in Saudi Arabia by specializing in the followers of the supreme chief’s marj’aiyyah, often known as “Khat al-Imam,” and its navy wing, “Hezbollah Al-Hejaz,” also referred to as “Saudi Hezbollah,” usually held chargeable for finishing up the 1996 assault. The most important problem in exploring this matter is that there aren’t any stable references for many of what has been written concerning the group. Certainly, the bulk of what’s attributed to Saudis who espouse Vali-ye faqih comes from their Shi’a rivals, which casts doubts on the credibility of the claims. This paper clarifies the underlying accounts concerning the group which have been cited by subsequent students and journalists in their very own narratives.
Khomeini, Khamenei, and Vali-ye Faqih
Since Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini (d 1989) got here to energy because the supreme chief of Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, there was a serious ongoing debate over the position of ayatollahs within the political sphere within the Center East. Khomeini influenced many Islamic activists worldwide, particularly Shi’a armed teams in Lebanon and Iraq, who thought-about him to be the marj’a with the best to make selections throughout the confines of shari’a regulation. Since 1989, Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, has legitimized his rule by taking over the place of Vali-ye faqih, which in idea means he serves as “the guardian of Muslims worldwide.” Regardless of the apparent doctrinal and geographic limitations, the idea in his transnational authority as a non secular and political chief is a serious concern for international locations the place some members of the Shi’a neighborhood comply with him because the grand marj’a. Shifting past Khomeini, Khamenei has expanded his management inside Shi’a communities as a contemporary marj’a. “By refined mechanisms, he has altered the symbolic and materials capability of the Shiite non secular establishments all through the area in his personal political favor, utilizing them for his anti-Western and anti-American coverage.”1
Khat al-Imam
The time period “Ansar Khat al-Imam” initially referred to the Iranian college students who stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, however subsequently has been broadened to incorporate all Shi’a activists who undertake the teachings and beliefs of Khomeini.
Breaking down this time period, the phrase ansar means “adherents” in Arabic, khat means “line” and is used to discuss with any group advocating a particular ideology, whereas Imam refers to Ayatollah Khomeini, who’s, not like different marj’as, referred to as Imam by his adherents. In Shi’a discourse, the time period Imam is meant for use completely for the Twelve Imams, who’re infallible. There are only a few exceptions the place the title is used for clergy, of which Khomeini is most essential. Thus, the time period Khat al-Imam means “the road or followers of Khomeini” — and naturally, of his successor Khamenei. This time period conveys loyalty to the Iranian supreme chief as a person who enjoys absolutely the guardianship of the ummah, or Muslim neighborhood, however this isn’t essentially restricted to the Iranian authorities. Nonetheless, it’s troublesome to separate the pinnacle of a state from his authorities.
When Ayatollah Khomeini was dwelling in exile in Najaf, Iraq (1965-78), some younger Saudi clergy met him and had been impressed by his charisma. In 1972, Sayyid Hashem bin Muhammad al-Shakhs moved from al-Ahsa in Saudi Arabia’s Japanese Province to Najaf to affix the seminary there. He attended Khomeini’s classes and step by step determined to take a unique path from his household, who historically adopted the foremost marj’aiyyah in Najaf. As an alternative of following the marj’aiyyah of Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei (d 1992), al-Shakhs adopted Khomeini’s. At the moment, Khomeini was a non secular chief who was lecturing concerning the ultimate Islamic authorities with a main give attention to Iran. He was not a preferred marj’a in comparison with al-Khoei in Najaf or Sayyid Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari (d 1986) in Qom, Iran, and his new followers from al-Ahsa attracted little consideration on the time, as they’d no political ambitions.
Throughout the Seventies, a variety of Saudi theological college students in Najaf, primarily from al-Ahsa, attended the teachings of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (d 1980), a younger marj’a who was very near Khomeini by way of his theocratic views. These younger college students had been influenced by al-Sadr’s mental discourse, which went past the normal educating of Shi’a seminaries in theology and jurisprudence to include trendy philosophy, economics, and politics. Al-Sadr was the marj’a adopted by the founders and adherents of the Islamic Dawa Celebration, which was banned by Iraq’s Ba’ath regime. Probably the most outstanding of these college students who engaged in work with the Dawa Celebration was Sheikh Abd al-Hadi al-Fadli (d 2013), the late chair of the Division of Arabic Language and Literature at King Abdulaziz College in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. After the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, lots of al-Sadr’s college students moved to Qom to flee oppression by the Iraqi authorities, particularly after al-Sadr was arrested and executed in April 1980.2 They began to attend the teachings of Ayatollahs Sayyid Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi (d 2018) and Sheikh Hussein Montazeri (d 2009), who was the designated successor of Khomeini earlier than he was eliminated previous to the latter’s dying in 1989. It’s value noting that Montazeri is the creator of a very powerful five-volume encyclopedia on Velayat-e faqih. Shahroudi was the chief of the Iranian judiciary for a decade, from 1999-2009, and was seen as a possible successor to Khamenei as supreme chief.3
In 1987, within the seminary of Qom, a variety of Saudi Shi’a clergy who used to attend al-Sadr’s classes in Najaf earlier than shifting to Iran created a gaggle referred to as Tajam’u ‘Ulama’ al-Hijaz (the Ingathering of Hejazi Clergy) and began their very own seminary. Hejaz is the historic title of the western a part of the Arabian Peninsula; they used it to point that they didn’t acknowledge the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a nationwide entity. Their selection was additionally aimed toward differentiating themselves from the opposite Shi’a opposition group that adopted the marj’aiyyah of Sayyid Muhammad Shirazi (d 2001), which had already picked the title munazzamat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-jazira al-‘Arabiyya (Islamic Revolution Group within the Arabian Peninsula, or IRO). The Shirazis and the IRO had been probably the most acknowledged Shi’a opposition group lively through the Eighties, earlier than they benefited from a royal pardon issued by King Fahd in 1993 to all Shi’a dissidents overseas.4 Accordingly, the brand new pro-Khomeini group selected to make use of the title of the area that’s residence to the foremost holy cities, Mecca and Medina, as an alternative of 1 referring to the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the Saudi Shi’a opposition often known as Jaziraiun or Jaziraieen are the followers of Shirazi, whereas Hijaziun or Hijazieen are the followers of Khomeini and Khamenei.
The vast majority of the Saudi Shi’a who adopted Khomeini’s marj’aiyyah in Eighties had been from al-Ahsa, resembling Hashem al-Shakhs and Sheikh Hussain al-Radhi. The one recognized scholar from Qatif who attended Khomeini’s classes in Najaf was Sheikh Abdul Jalil bin Marhoon al-Ma’a. Later, in Qom, a number of Qatifi younger clergy joined the group of Saudi adherents of Khomeini’s marj’aiyyah, resembling Sheikh Abd al-Karim al-Hubayl and Sheikh Mentioned al-Bahar. In contrast to the Shirazi line, Khat al-Imam is extra well-liked in al-Ahsa than Qatif. The explanation for this could be that the clergy who attended Khomeini and al-Sadr’s classes in Najaf through the Seventies had been members of al-Ahsa’s noble households, because the social paradigm in al-Ahsa is extra organized and stable than in Qatif. Thus, it’s typical for many members of the identical prolonged household — which might quantity within the hundreds — to comply with the identical marj’a. In Qatif, a lot of the followers of Khat al-Imam had been from two particular villages, al-Rabia‘iya (Tarut) and al-Jaroudiya.
These clergy had been specializing in non secular educating and selling Khomeini’s marj’aiyyah among the many Saudi Shi’a neighborhood. They had been apolitical, and certainly, “had not taken a part of the intifada [uprising] that was the important thing founding occasion of shirazi motion.”5
Whereas the variety of followers that every marj’a has is unclear, observers can provide you with some estimates of the tough measurement of the assorted divisions throughout the Shi’a neighborhood. In Saudi Arabia, Khomeini had far fewer followers than different figures like al-Khoei (d 1992) and even Shirazi (d 2001). Nonetheless, a few of al-Khoei’s followers had been supporters of Khomeini. After he handed away in 1989 and Khamenei succeeded him as supreme chief, Khamenei didn’t initially current himself as a marj’a. Tehran supported the marj’aiyyah of Sayyid Mohammad-Reza Golpaygani (d 1993) after which Sheikh Muhammad Ali Araki (d 1994). After that, Khamenei declared himself as a marj’a and introduced the marj’aiyyah again to the Vali-ye faqih. Since then, a substantial variety of Saudi Shi’a began to comply with him as their marj’a, nearly all of whom had been born within the late Seventies. Certainly, it was a development to comply with Khamenei within the mid-Nineteen Nineties, as youth who weren’t within the conventional marj’aiyyah had no different selection after the Shirazis abolished their political opposition and returned to the dominion after being granted a royal pardon.
It’s no shock to seek out apolitical Shi’a following Khat al-Imam. There is a vital side of Khomeini’s character, the Irfan, which is a kind of Islamic mysticism, however principally emphasised in Shi’a educating. The Shi’a who’re impressed by Khomeini’s Irfan won’t be taken with his political position. Certainly, they’d think about his political and navy actions to be a consequence of his distinctive means to take care of the materialistic world. This perspective is supported by sure tales of Iranian victories in opposition to their enemies, particularly the U.S. and its allies. One instance is Operation Eagle Claw, when President Jimmy Carter ordered america Armed Forces to penetrate Iranian territory to rescue the U.S. Embassy workers held captive in Tehran. The navy operation, which came about on April 24, 1980, failed for a number of causes, together with sudden unhealthy climate within the Tabas Desert. The U.S. misplaced three out of eight helicopters that had been despatched on the mission.6 This story is utilized in Iranian propaganda as an indication of God’s blessing of Khomeini and the revolution, and it and different related examples supported Khomeini’s non secular side. There are additionally different tales about Khomeini and Khamenei, in addition to the ayatollahs who supported the revolution, resembling Sheikh Mohammad-Taqi Bahjat Foumani (d 2009) and Sheikh Abdollah Javadi-Amoli.
Hezbollah Al-Hejaz
The title “Hezbollah” recollects the armed teams that adopted Khomeini’s ideology, resembling Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi militias, particularly Kata’ib Hezbollah. Basically, little or no is thought about Hezbollah Al-Hejaz itself, together with who their members are or which companies they work with regularly. The accessible info is proscribed and principally consists of the names of people who had been accused of involvement in violent assaults with a robust suspicion of an affiliation with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This speculation is affordable, for the reason that IRGC is the Iranian company that works with all of Tehran’s related militias worldwide.7
As with most particulars about Hezbollah Al-Hejaz, the date of its founding is unclear. Based on Toby Matthiesen, “Hezbollah Al-Hejaz was based in Might 1987. One week after the hajj incident it vowed to battle the Saudi ruling household.”8 The 1987 Mecca incident occurred on July 31 — when greater than 400 folks had been killed following violent clashes between Iranian Shi’a pilgrims and Saudi safety forces — and the threatening assertion was issued that August. It was the primary assertion attributed to the group, and through that three-month interval between Might and August there was nothing to immediate an escalation in opposition to the Saudi authorities.
The 1987 Mecca incident represents a turning level in tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia.9 Till then, the Iranians didn’t have dependable adherents inside Saudi Arabia. The Shirazis promoted propaganda in opposition to the Saudi authorities and the royal household. Regardless of the navy coaching camps the IRO was operating in Tehran, the Shirazis weren’t severely taken with finishing up navy operations, as they had been conscious of the implications. In contrast, the Iranians understood that it finest served their pursuits to maintain such propaganda lively, even when the Shirazis couldn’t do extra than simply media work. As well as, the Shirazis misplaced an essential ally within the Iranian authorities, Mehdi Hashemi, the pinnacle of the Workplace of Liberation Actions, the company chargeable for supporting organizations just like the IRO. The Iranian authorities accused him of leaking particulars concerning the Iran-Contra Affair in late 1986. Hashemi was subsequently executed in 1987 and the Workplace of Liberation Actions closed.10
The identification of the Saudi founders of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz can also be unsure. The one recognized names are these already concerned in or accused of collaborating in navy operations on Saudi territory. Probably the most acknowledged names had been initially a part of the Shirazis earlier than shifting their ideology towards Vali-ye faqih. An important title is Ahmad al-Mughasal, who grew to become the chief of the navy wing of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz. Al-Mughasal determined to go away the IRO as a result of he didn’t discover its ideology and actions revolutionary sufficient.11 One other former member of the IRO who joined Hezbollah Al-Hejaz was Khalid al-Ulq, one of many 4 members of a Hezbollah cell accused of bombing the SADAF petrochemical plant in Jubail in March 1988; al-Ulq and his companions had been later executed that September.
There are a number of items that discuss with both Hezbollah Al-Hejaz or Saudi Hezbollah. Nonetheless, the image continues to be blurry, because the literature affords little in the way in which of element. Certainly, most of what has been written on this matter was based mostly on their rivals’ narratives — that’s, the previous members of the IRO. The most important unique reference about Hezbollah Al-Hejaz was written by Fouad Ibrahim, a former member of the IRO, who wrote a ebook entitled The Shi‘is of Saudi Arabia (2006). Toby Matthiesen constructed on Ibrahim’s story and wrote a variety of items about Shi’a within the Gulf. In 2010, he revealed an article entitled “Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A Historical past of The Most Radical Saudi Shi‘a Opposition Group,” adopted by a ebook 4 years later, The Different Saudis. The argument in each instances was constructed on Ibrahim’s narrative, supported by interviews — performed by Matthiesen — with former members of the IRO. Most later students and journalists constructed their narratives on Matthiesen’s work. Thus, it’s no shock to seek out that the majority of what has been written about Hezbollah Al-Hejaz solely touches on it in passing, as a gaggle on the sidelines of the Shirazis and the IRO, quite than investigating the essence of the group and Khat al-Imam.
At present, Matthiesen is taken into account the important reference on Shi’a political historical past in Saudi Arabia. Researchers and journalists who write on the subject base their work on his narrative and settle for it at face worth. He, in flip, accepted the Shirazis’ narrative at face worth. That’s to say, the Shirazis are, in impact, passing on their narrative about their rivals by a Western scholar. For instance, in his article “Iran and Hizbullah: A Very Particular Relationship,” Muhammad Fawzy based mostly his complete argument about Hezbollah Al-Hejaz on Matthiesen’s narrative.12
There’s even a ebook (in Arabic) entitled Hezbollah al-Hejaz: Bedayat wa Nehayat Tanzeem Irhabi (Hezbollah al-Hejaz: Starting and Finish of a Terrorist Group). Hamad al-Issa, who offered himself as its translator, referred to Matthiesen’s 2010 article as the unique work translated. Regardless of the mistranslation of the title, which modified “radical” to “terrorist,” the ebook ready by al-Issa is 190 pages lengthy, whereas Matthiesen’s article is simply 18 pages.
One other signal that researchers have taken Matthiesen at face worth is that a lot of the Arab writers merely copied-and-pasted from his work with out even checking primary info like names. For instance, many Arabic books and articles referred to Sheikh Abdul Jalil al-Ma’a, a pacesetter in Khat al-Imam, by the transcription of the title, which makes the final title (al-Ma’a) sound very unusual, as there is no such thing as a such household in Qatif. None of those Arab writers tried to seek out the best full title, which is Sheikh Abdul Jalil bin Marhoon al-Ma’a (al-Ma’a pronounced identical to the phrase “water” in Arabic). Marhoon al-Ma’a is a household in Tarut, Qatif and other people there omit the primary a part of it (Marhoon), as there are different households that use al-Marhoon as their final title.
Early Actions
Hezbollah Al-Hejaz was based in 1987 at a time when tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia reached their peak. On August 16 of that yr, an explosion occurred at one among ARAMCO’s petroleum amenities in Ra’s al-Ju’ayma (32 km north of Qatif). One other two assaults came about in March 1988, one at a SADAF petrochemical facility in Jubail (75 km north of Qatif) and the opposite on the Ra’s Tanura refinery (27 km north of Qatif), for which a “new group referred to as hizbullah [sic] claimed accountability.”13 These assaults adopted a number of clashes with Hezbollah Al-Hejaz’s fighters that resulted of their arrest, together with the killing and damage of a number of Saudi policemen.
The 4 members of the cell accused of finishing up the SADAF assault had been executed. As well as, a variety of suspected followers of Khat al-Imam had been arrested and later launched after a royal pardon was issued for Shi’a prisoners, as part of a take care of the Harakat al-Islahiyah (the Reform Motion), the brand new title of the IRO after it deserted its revolutionary ideology, the members of which returned to the dominion in 1993.
Hezbollah Al-Hejaz was not the one secret Saudi pro-Iranian group that claimed to hold out assaults in Center East. Within the late Eighties, there was a collection of assassinations of Saudi diplomats in Ankara, Bangkok, and Karachi claimed by two organizations, Jund al-Haqq (Troopers of the Proper) and Munazzamat al-Jihad al-Islami fi al-Hijaz (Islamic Jihad Group in Hejaz).14 There aren’t any particulars about these organizations past their statements claiming accountability for the assaults and saying they had been based mostly in Beirut.
Some researchers resembling Joshua Teitelbaum15 and Matthiesen16 see these organizations as a part of the navy wing of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz. But within the Nineteen Nineties and after, they disappeared they usually have by no means issued another statements or claimed accountability for another operations, together with the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996.
Within the early Nineteen Nineties, the tensions between the Saudi Shi’a neighborhood and their authorities appeared quiet. After Ayatollah Khamenei declared his marj’aiyyah, many younger Shi’a espoused his marj’aiyyah as a part of adopting Islamism throughout the Shi’a neighborhood.
The context at the moment is important, as many Sunni fanatics had been confronting the Saudi authorities, blaming it for receiving help from Western forces to liberate Kuwait and letting them stay on Saudi soil afterwards. These Western forces had a strategic mission within the Gulf area that was past the slender minds of these fanatics, who had been targeted on what they thought-about to be unjustified delicate attitudes towards secular people and Shi’a. Sheikhs resembling Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Ouda, and Nasser al-Omar had been the main fanatical Sunni clergy at the moment.17 This context created one of the best probability for Iranian intelligence to seek for adherents to serve its agenda.
On June 25, 1996, the foremost terrorist assault in Khobar introduced tensions between the Saudi Shi’a neighborhood and their authorities to a head, because the discourse that they had been “followers of Iran” was promoted within the native media.
Khobar Towers Bombing
The Khobar Towers advanced, situated in Saudi Arabia’s Japanese Province (50 km south of Qatif), hosted 2,000 U.S. navy workers assigned to King Abdulaziz Air Base in Khobar metropolis. Constructing 131 was a housing advanced for members of the U.S. Air Power assigned to Operation Southern Watch, tasked with imposing the no-fly zone in southern Iraq.
On June 25, someday between 9:30 and 10:00 pm, Sgt. Alfredo R. Guerrero and Airman Christopher T. Wagar had been standing on the roof of Constructing 131. They seen a white four-door Chevrolet Caprice driving by the car parking zone, with one other car slowly following. It was a Mercedes-Benz gasoline truck with a capability of three,500-4,000 gallons. Two males received out of the tanker truck, ran to the white Caprice, and left. At this level, Guerrero and Wagar had been sure the tanker truck was a bomb. Not removed from Constructing 131, Senior Airman Craig J. Dick was patrolling in a navy car when he heard a safety alert on his radio and sped to the scene. He pulled up close to the constructing, joined Guerrero and Wagar, and the three safety policemen started evacuating the highest two flooring of Constructing 131.18
Their swift motion and energy to evacuate the constructing didn’t totally forestall casualties, nevertheless. Whereas the three safety policemen had been capable of start evacuating the constructing, the explosion occurred simply three minutes later, earlier than the evacuation could possibly be accomplished. The end result was 19 killed (all Individuals) and 498 of various nationalities wounded. It was the bloodiest assault focusing on U.S. forces for the reason that Beirut Marine barracks bombing in 1983.19
The presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and the remainder of the Persian Gulf was a priority for each Iran and al-Qaeda. For authorized and diplomatic causes, Iran had very restricted means to specific its displeasure. Al-Qaeda, as a terrorist group, had made its perspective towards the American presence within the “Land of the Two Holy Mosques” clear, nevertheless. Just a few months earlier, on November 13, 1995, it carried out an assault in opposition to a U.S.-operated Nationwide Guard Coaching Heart in Riyadh. 5 Individuals and two Indians had been killed, whereas 60 folks of various nationalities had been wounded. Shortly thereafter, the Saudi authorities arrested and executed the 4 Saudi people who carried out the assault. The cell members appeared on nationwide TV and acknowledged that they had been impressed by Osama bin Laden.20
Given the account of the final assault by al-Qaeda in Riyadh, fingers had been initially pointed on the transnational radical Sunni group. Shortly thereafter, nevertheless, the main target turned towards radical Shi’a impressed by Iran, specifically Hezbollah Al-Hejaz. The primary indication of the involvement of the Saudi Shi’a gaggle and Iran was throughout a gathering between Louis J. Freeh, director of the FBI, and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., on the prince’s residency in McLean, Virginia. Freeh acknowledged that he discovered for the primary time that Hezbollah was lively within the Japanese Province of Saudi Arabia, whereas “Bandar agreed it was attainable, however he doubted that was the case.”21 Following that assembly, the FBI labored with Prince Bandar in Washington, D.C. and the Mabahith, the Saudi secret police company (corresponding to the U.S. FBI), in Riyadh.
Because the investigation moved ahead, suspicions more and more targeted on Iran and its native adherents. The FBI discovered from the Saudis that two months earlier than the assault, they’d arrested a Qatif native making an attempt to smuggle 38 kilograms of plastic explosives obtained in Lebanon.22 The Saudi authorities later arrested three others as effectively.23 They subsequently detained many Saudi Shi’as who had been considered followers of Khat al-Imam and attainable members of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz.
Within the first chapter of his memoir, Freeh offered an in depth account of the assault, which included the position of every defendant. He didn’t point out his references, which means that the small print had been based mostly on the investigation he headed from the U.S. aspect. Freeh’s narrative was not more than a abstract of the formal prices in opposition to the group of 13 Saudi and one Lebanese Shi’a.24
Matthew Levitt additionally offers a extra detailed account of the assault, particularly the preparation and surveillance of Individuals in Saudi Arabia.25 In contrast to Freeh, Levitt was not personally concerned within the case and his account attracts on the small print within the formal lawsuit in opposition to these talked about above.
It’s fascinating that the narrative is completely from the U.S. aspect. There is no such thing as a official account from the Saudi aspect. However, Saudi media use an identical narrative, with none affirmation or denial from Saudi officers, though after all they’d not unfold a story rejected by the federal government.
The Saudi authorities has not shared its full formal account of what occurred within the Khobar Towers bombing. The media have by no means talked about the trials or the sentences. Nonetheless, there are a number of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz prices in opposition to the defendants, together with smuggling explosive supplies and finishing up surveillance of Westerners (primarily Individuals) in Saudi Arabia. This could be the results of a Saudi technique to keep away from being concerned in any navy retaliation by the U.S. in opposition to Iran. Or there could also be different info that the Saudis consider shouldn’t be shared for one of the best curiosity of the case itself.
There are additionally query marks across the American place as effectively, given the small print offered by Freeh and within the lawsuit filed in June 2001. Hani al-Sayegh, one of many defendants, was transferred from Canada to the U.S. in 1997 and spent two years below arrest there earlier than being transferred once more to Saudi Arabia. It’s unclear why the Clinton administration, of which Freeh was half on the time, handed al-Sayegh over, as they deliberate to file a lawsuit accusing him of collaborating in a “conspiracy to make use of weapons of mass destruction in opposition to United States nationals.”26
Whereas media shops in each Saudi Arabia and the U.S. confirmed the accusations of Iranian involvement within the Khobar Towers bombing, some writers have argued that it was al-Qaeda, not a Shi’a gaggle, that carried out the operation.
William J. Perry, america secretary of protection on the time of the bombing, stated in an interview on the 11th anniversary of the assault that he “consider that the Khobar Tower bombing was most likely masterminded by Osama bin Laden.” He continued, saying, “I can’t make sure of that, however on reflection, that’s what I consider. On the time, he was not a suspect. On the time … all the proof was pointing to Iran.”27
Gareth Porter, an American historian and investigative journalist, wrote an article entitled “Al Qaeda Excluded from the Suspects Listing,” shedding doubt on the end result of the FBI investigation, which concluded by accusing Iran and a few of its Saudi adherents of accountability for the assault. Based on Porter, “Freeh shortly made Iranian and Saudi Shi’a accountability for the bombing the official premise of the investigation, excluding from the inquiry the speculation that Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda group had carried out the Khobar Towers bombing.”28
Porter adopted this text with one other 4 items defending his different narrative of the bombing. Porter clearly has a detrimental notion of Freeh, seeing him as below Saudi affect. He wrote, “Freeh allowed Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan to persuade him that Iran was concerned within the bombing, and that President Invoice Clinton, for whom he had fashioned a visceral dislike, ‘had no real interest in confronting the truth that Iran had blown up the towers,’ as Freeh wrote in his memoirs.”29 Nonetheless, Porter didn’t touch upon Freeh’s assertion that “Bandar agreed it was attainable [accusing Iran and Shi’a radicals, not Sunni radicals], however he doubted that was the case.”30 Based on Freeh, the Saudi ambassador shared some info with the FBI director with out expressing certainty about accusing Iran or a radical Shi’a gaggle.
Porter based mostly his argument on statements attributed to nameless former “FBI officers concerned within the investigation who refused to be recognized.” Utilizing an nameless supply to assist a declare is one factor; nevertheless, it’s laborious to simply accept a story totally constructed round one. That’s to say, it’s Freeh’s phrase in opposition to that of an nameless particular person.
Porter’s argument casts doubt on the credibility of the entire U.S. safety system below each Presidents Invoice Clinton and George W. Bush. However the query could be raised for Porter: Why would the U.S. reply in such a approach? Furthermore, the broader thrust of Porter’s work raises different questions as effectively, as it’s clear he doesn’t assist robust ties between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, a degree made in articles like “Time to Finish the Ruinous U.S. Alliance with Saudi Arabia.”31
Abdel Bari Atwan, the Palestinian former editor-in-chief of the London-based newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi who interviewed Osama bin Laden in 1996, insisted that the assault ought to be attributed to Bin Laden. He offered solely very restricted particulars to assist the declare, saying, “The late Abu Laith al-Libi fought in Afghanistan and returned to Libya in 1994 within the hope of beginning an Islamic revolution, subsequently fleeing to Saudi Arabia — the place he was implicated within the Khobar Towers bombings — after which again to Afghanistan, the place he has been one of many high commanders of AQAM battalions preventing with the Taliban.”32 His account consists of no particulars concerning the position of Abu Laith al-Libi and the cell members that supposedly carried out this assault. It’s value noting that Bin Laden didn’t concern a press release claiming accountability, as he usually did in a lot of the operations al-Qaeda carried out.
The absence of detailed narratives from both the Saudi and Iranian governments, or of any assertion from al-Qaeda concerning the bombing, signifies that most accounts are based mostly on the official U.S. model of what occurred. Delicate info or political issues appear to be stopping the events concerned from sharing all the particulars they’ve. Till that occurs, observers must depend on the data accessible within the literature and media accounts.
Main Names of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz
A lot of the American references think about Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed al-Nasser as “the alleged chief of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz.”33 The U.S. authorities provided a $5 million bounty for info resulting in his arrest.34 Nonetheless, there may be not a lot details about him. He’s not a well known scholar or a preacher, neither is he a public determine in al-Ahsa, from which he hails. It is vitally fascinating that the person who is meant to be the chief of such a company is so obscure and there’s no description of his position throughout the group or any info and even rumors about what grew to become of him. The chief of such a company ought to have a transparent position and signal his title to its pronouncements. Since he was acknowledged as the pinnacle of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz, he has by no means launched any assertion. Nonetheless, since 1993, Hezbollah Al-Hejaz has issued only a few assertion regarding Saudi affairs.35
Probably the most often cited title among the many members of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz is Ahmed Ibrahim al-Mughassil, a.ok.a. “Abu Omran” from Qatif. For the reason that early Nineteen Nineties, all reviews concerning the radical Saudi Shi’a gaggle’s actions determine him as its navy commander. He was touring between Iran, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, utilizing pretend passports and disguising his look. Primarily based on particulars within the formal lawsuit, he was in command of the Khobar Towers bombing and was chargeable for planning the assault and coaching the members of the cell who carried it out. Similar to for al-Nasser, the U.S. authorities provided a $5 million bounty for info resulting in his arrest.36 In August 2015, he was apprehended in Beirut and transferred to Saudi Arabia.37
One other title often talked about by the media is Hani al-Sayegh, who was the primary individual Freeh referenced in his ebook My FBI. Freeh even specified al-Sayegh’s alleged position within the bombing, suggesting he served as a driver of the scout car and parked within the far nook of Constructing 131. Beside driving the scout car, al-Sayegh, the lawsuit suggests, participated in varied different points of the assault, together with conducting surveillance reviews in several components of Saudi Arabia and serving to to arrange the truck bomb at a farm in Qatif. But the concept that one individual, not to mention a small man affected by bronchial asthma, might play this huge of a task and perform all of those duties appears implausible. Al-Sayegh went to Canada in August 1996 and was arrested in March 1997 earlier than being transferred to america that June. He agreed to help U.S. officers investigating the bombing as a part of a plea cut price. He later reneged on his settlement and requested asylum within the U.S.38 In October 1999, the Justice Division stated that “the U.S. lacks adequate proof to cost Sayegh in an American court docket.”39 Thus, he was deported to Saudi Arabia, the place he’s at present imprisoned.
The remainder of the names, both imprisoned in Saudi Arabia or with an unknown destiny, will not be as essential because the three names talked about. Their alleged contributions to the Khobar Towers bombing recommend they’re “troopers” quite than the leaders of the group.40
The alleged non-Saudi actors who hyperlink Hezbollah Al-Hejaz to the IRGC or Lebanese Hezbollah are additionally fairly unclear. There are some references, beginning with an article written by Thomas L. Friedman in March 1997, during which he talked about an “Iranian intelligence officer who goes by varied code names, together with ‘Sherifi’ and ‘Abu Jallal,’ acted as a liaison between Tehran and Saudi Shiites in Lebanon.”41 Additionally, within the lawsuit filed in June 2001 there may be an unidentified Lebanese Hezbollah operative referred to within the indictment merely as John Doe. These nicknames had been doubtless given to the people by liaison officers charged with linking Hezbollah Al-Hejaz to Iranian companies. Nonetheless, it isn’t clear how U.S. safety companies just like the FBI got here up with these assumptions. For instance, why is there just one Lebanese Hezbollah agent concerned within the Khobar Towers bombing or one specific IRGC officer who offers with Hezbollah Al-Hejaz? And extra importantly, these assumptions should be unpacked and extra element offered explaining the premises that led to those conclusions.
The 2011 Uprisings
Following the Khobar Towers bombing, Iran’s adherents, together with Hezbollah Al-Hejaz, had been absent from the scene. Till the Arab Spring uprisings occurred in several components of Arab world, Iranian brokers weren’t a severe risk to the governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Beginning in 2011, nevertheless, some GCC governments as soon as once more started clearly accusing Iran and its native brokers of finishing up acts of sabotage.
In February 2011, uprisings started in Qatif, one of many kingdom’s main Shi’a cities, at a time when related occasions had been happening throughout the area, together with in neighboring Shi’a-majority Bahrain, as a part of the Arab Spring. Whereas the small print are past the scope of this text, it’s value briefly exploring the position of Iran’s adherents through the rebellion (2011-17).
The slogans utilized by protesters had been very normal, calling for freedom, Shi’a rights, dignity, and anti-discrimination. Nonetheless, on March 9-10, 2011, the protesters began carrying the photographs of al-sujana’ al-mansiyun (the forgotten prisoners), referring to the 9 prisoners of the Khobar Towers bombing. At the moment, the Saudi authorities issued a number of statements accusing Iran of involvement in Saudi affairs, identical to the Bahraini authorities. On the similar time, official Iranian statements supported the protests in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and blamed the 2 royal governments for the tensions amongst their residents.
There is no such thing as a detailed narrative of Iranian involvement in Saudi Arabia’s Japanese Province between 2011 and 2017, however it’s laborious to think about that the Iranians had been merely observing the scene. Primarily based on native references, some Saudi Shi’a people acknowledged receiving coaching in Iran or Iraq. A few of them had been satisfied to go to Iran or Iraq to carry out non secular pilgrimages or for different related causes and located themselves in coaching amenities. Based on these accounts, there was no instruction to hold out assaults, nor had been weapons provided; they had been merely given primary coaching. The Saudi authorities has not launched any particulars concerning Iran’s involvement within the area at the moment — maybe for safety or political causes.
On March 19, 2013, the Saudi authorities introduced that they “had arrested an 18-member spy ring, together with an Iranian, a Lebanese, and 16 Saudis.”42 The variety of detainees subsequently elevated. Saudi courts later sentenced 15 Saudis to dying for spying for Iran and 15 others to jail phrases starting from six months to 25 years.43 On April 23, 2019, 11 members of this group had been executed.44 Whereas the Iranian authorities denied recruiting spies in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh accused Tehran of deep involvement in its inside affairs.
However, throughout this era, Hezbollah Al-Hejaz has not been formally held chargeable for any of those unlawful actions. Nonetheless, the Saudi authorities did embrace it of their listing of terrorist teams in March 2014.45 The UAE adopted swimsuit and included Hezbollah Al-Hejaz in its listing of terrorist teams in November of the identical yr.46
Conclusion
Longstanding tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia stay a serious concern as the 2 international locations have their very own, very completely different views on the way forward for the Center East. Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of meddling in its home affairs, whereas Iran denies such claims. A part of this stress is because of the Saudi Shi’a neighborhood, as Riyadh accuses Tehran of recruiting people to serve its pursuits by teams like Hezbollah Al-Hejaz, the key group allegedly linked to the IRGC.
Khat al-Imam, the followers of Khamenei’s marj’aiyyah, have been suspected of being members of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz. As this paper explains, there’s a restricted connection between Khat al-Imam and Hezbollah Al-Hejaz: Most of the followers of Khat al-Imam think about Khamenei as a marj’a and are impressed by Khomeini’s Irfan, which leads them to admire some apolitical Iranian clergy resembling Bahjat Foumani and Javadi-Amoli.
But the Iranian affect upon some members of the Saudi Shi’a neighborhood is plain. It’s troublesome to find out how intensive it’s, nevertheless, given the restricted availability of details about the assaults that occurred in Nineteen Nineties, particularly the Khobar Towers bombing.
Lately, the Saudi authorities has carried out some reforms to its deradicalization efforts, partially with a watch to countering the sectarian discourse within the nationwide media. Within the final 4 years, Saudi media shops have begun to distinguish Iran’s ambitions as a regional energy from Shiism as an Islamic sect. This modification in perspective by Saudi media shops has been effectively obtained by the Saudi Shi’a neighborhood, as they don’t wish to be focused by their fellow residents and accused of being a fifth column for a overseas nation.
Whereas many Saudi Shi’a had been impressed by Khomeini’s charisma within the Eighties, they didn’t think about him the grand marj’a and his marj’aiyyah was not extensively well-liked in Saudi Arabia. This modified with the youth era of the Nineteen Nineties — those that had been born a number of years earlier than the Iranian revolution — who began to emulate Khamenei as their grand marj’a. But nearly all of those that did so claimed their relationship with him was an bizarre non secular one, identical to the followers of Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Sistani or different marj’as. The query that ought to be requested right here is: What occurs after Khamenei? Would they comply with the subsequent supreme chief of Iran? If the reply is sure, this implies that for Khat al-Imam the marj’aiyyah has gone past only a non secular place to grow to be a political one as effectively. This situation will grow to be clear if nearly all of Khat al-Imam adopts the marj’aiyyah of the subsequent supreme chief. Many individuals anticipate Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, Iran’s present president, to step into that position and we must always wait to see if he — or whoever else takes on the place — will acquire a sizeable following for Tehran’s marj’aiyyah.
Whereas loads of questions stay about Hezbollah Al-Hejaz, this paper reveals the background and limitations of the foremost references on the subject and offers a stable narrative based mostly on the accessible info, with out following the propaganda that serves the agenda of assorted events.
In regards to the Creator
Dr. Abdullah F. Alrebh is Affiliate Professor in Sociology of Faith and Sociological Idea at Grand Valley State College and a Non-resident Scholar at MEI. His analysis focuses on politics, tradition, faith, and authority of Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf, and Islam. He has revealed a variety of articles (peer-reviewed and suppose tank) spanning a number of points pertaining to non secular, authority, and training with a main specializing in Center Japanese international locations basically, and Saudi Arabia particularly. His upcoming ebook is titled, Masking the Kingdom: Saudi Arabia in Western Press through the twentieth Century. He’s the Editor of the Michigan Sociological Assessment.
Prime picture by Aritra Deb, Shutterstock.
MEI is an unbiased, non-partisan, non-for-profit, academic group. It doesn’t interact in advocacy and its students’ opinions are their very own. MEI welcomes monetary donations, however retains sole editorial management over its work and its publications replicate solely the authors’ views. For an inventory of MEI donors, please click on right here.
Endnotes
- Khalaji, Mahdi (2006). The Final Marja: Sistani and the Finish of Conventional Spiritual Authority in Shiism. Washington Institute for Close to East Coverage. Pp. V. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3502?disposition=inline
- Matthiesen, Toby (2010). “Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A Historical past of The Most Radical Saudi Shi’a Opposition Group.” The Center East Journal 64, no. 2 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/380306
- Sahimi, Muhammad (January 3, 2016). Who Will Succeed Ayatollah Khamenei? HuffPost Information. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ayatollah-khamenei-successor-_b_8908618
- The Shirazis’ actions in Saudi Arabia had been restricted to media propaganda; nevertheless, they had been lively in Bahrain and a few Saudi members participated within the 1981 Bahraini coup try.
- Matthiesen, T. (2014). The opposite Saudis: Shiism, dissent and sectarianism (Vol. 46). Cambridge College Press. P. 133.
- Bowden, Mark (Might 2006). The Desert One Debacle. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/journal/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/
- Alrebh, Abdullah (March 2021). Radical shiism and Iranian affect in Saudi Arabia. Interview with European Eye on Radicalization. https://eeradicalization.com/radical-shiism-and-iranian-influence-in-saudi-arabia/
- Matthiesen (2014) pp. 133-134, see additionally Matthiesen (2010) p. 184.
- The incident took a spot in Mecca, the road battles beside the Grand Mosque. The clashes started when some Iranian pilgrims massed after Friday’s prayers for a political demonstration, which is banned by the Saudi authorities. The pilgrims, who had been brandishing photos of Ayatollah Khomeini, chanted, ”Loss of life to America! Loss of life to the Soviet Union! Loss of life to Israel!” The incident triggered the dying of 400 pilgrims. Supply: The New York Instances https://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/world/400-die-iranian-marchers-battle-saudi-police-mecca-embassies-smashed-teheran.html
- Matthiesen (2010), pp. 183-184.
- An interview with a former member of the IRO who was very near al-Mughasal for few years. The identification of this member is remained nameless based mostly on his requests.
- Fawzy, Muhammad (January-March 2015). “Iran and Hizbullah: A Very Particular Relationship.” Annals of the School of Arts, Ain Shams College, (43) 453-506.
- Ibrahim, Fouad N. (2006). The Shiʻis of Saudi Arabia. London: Al Saqi. P. 142.
- The archive of Addiyar (Lebanese newspaper).
October 27, 1988: https://addiyar.com/article/607793-الصفحة-11-27101988
January 10, 1989: https://addiyar.com/article/643221-الصفحة-10-1011989 - Teitelbaum, Joshua (Nov 14, 1996). Saudi Arabia’s Shi`i Opposition: Background and Evaluation. The Washington Institute for Close to East Coverage. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/saudi-arabias-shii-opposition-background-and-analysis
- Matthiesen (2014) p. 137.
- All these three are at present below detention and trial by the Saudi authorities.
- Jamieson, Perry. D. (2008). Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response. Authorities Printing Workplace. Pp. 9-13.
- Riedel, Bruce (June 21, 2021). Remembering the Khobar Towers bombing. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/weblog/order-from-chaos/2021/06/21/remembering-the-khobar-towers-bombing/
- Cordesman, Anthony H. and Nawaf Obaid (January 26, 2005). Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Uneven Threats and Islamist Extremists. Heart for Strategic and Worldwide Research (CSIS). Washington, DC https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/recordsdata/media/csis/pubs/050106_al-qaedainsaudi.pdf
- Freeh, L. J., & Means, H. B. (2006). My FBI: Bringing down the Mafia, investigating Invoice Clinton, and preventing the Warfare on Terror. MacMillan. P. 9.
- Freeh & Means (2006), p. 10.
- Kirkpatrick, David D. (August 26, 2015). Saudi Arabia Mentioned to Arrest Suspect in 1996 Khobar Towers Bombing. The New York Instances. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/world/middleeast/saudia-arabia-arrests-suspect-khobar-towers-bombing.html
- UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA- ALEXANDRIA DIVISION (June 2001 TERM). Conspiracy to Kill United States Nationals. CRIMINAL NO: 01-228-A. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB318/doc05.pdf
- Levitt, Matthew (2015). Hezbollah: The World Footprint of Lebanon’s Celebration of God. Georgetown College Press. Pp. 181-208.
The identical story was repeated by Levitt in his article titled “Anatomy of a Bombing: How Ahmed al-Mughassil Bombed Khobar Tower and Walked Free—Till Now” which was publish by International Affairs in September 1, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/lebanon/2015-09-01/anatomy-bombing - UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, p. 1
- United Press Worldwide, Inc. (June 6, 2007). Perry: U.S. eyed Iran assault after bombing. https://www.upi.com/Protection-Information/2007/06/06/Perry-US-eyed-Iran-attack-after-bombing/70451181161509/?u3L=1
- Porter, Gareth (June 22 2009). EXCLUSIVE-PART1: Al Qaeda Excluded from the Suspects Listing. Inter Press Service. https://www.ipsnews.web/2009/06/exclusive-part1-al-qaeda-excluded-from-the-suspects-list/
- Ibid.
- Freeh & Means, P. 9.
- Porter, Gareth (October 26, 2018). Time to Finish the Ruinous U.S. Alliance with Saudi Arabia. Frequent Goals (initially revealed with Center East Eye). https://www.commondreams.org/views/2018/10/26/time-end-ruinous-us-alliance-saudi-arabia
- Atwan, A. B. (2013). After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the subsequent era. The New Press. P. 202.
- FBI Most Needed Listing. https://www.fbi.gov/wished/wanted_terrorists/abdelkarim-hussein-mohamed-al-nasser
- The announcement is accessible on the Division of Justice web site: https://rewardsforjustice.web/rewards/abdelkarim-hussein-mohamed-al-nasser/
- For instance, the next assertion issues the executions carried in March 2022, the assertion was revealed in a Bahraini dissenting web site: https://www.al-abdal.web/32273/حزب-الله-الحجاز-مجزرة-شعبان-الكبرى/
- FBI Most Needed Listing. https://www.fbi.gov/wished/wanted_terrorists/ahmad-ibrahim-al-mughassil
- Riedel, Bruce (August 26, 2015). Captured: Mastermind behind the 1996 Khobar Towers assault. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/weblog/markaz/2015/08/26/captured-mastermind-behind-the-1996-khobar-towers-attack/
- Levitt, p. 200.
- Karon, Tony (October 5, 1999). The Curious Case of Hani al-Sayegh. TIME. http://content material.time.com/time/journal/article/0,9171,31972,00.html
- All of the names can be found within the formal in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, p. 1
- https://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/25/opinion/stay-tuned.html
- USA At present. (March 26, 2013). Saudi Arabia says spy ring labored for Iran. https://www.usatoday.com/story/information/world/2013/03/26/saudi-arabia-spy-iran/2020799/
- BBC. (December 6, 2016). Fifteen Saudi Shia sentenced to dying for ‘spying for Iran’.
- Hubbard, Ben. (April 23, 2019). Saudi Arabia Executes 37 in One Day for Terrorism. The New York Instances. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-executions.html
- Youssef, B. A. & Adam Baron (March 7, 2014). Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group. Kansascity. https://www.kansascity.com/2014/03/07/4873900/saudi-arabia-declares-muslim-brotherhood.html#storylink=cpy
- Emirates Information Company. (November 15, 2014). The Council of Ministers approves the listing of terrorist organizations. https://internet.archive.org/internet/20141117230142/http://www.wam.ae/ar/information/emirates-arab-international/1395272465559.html
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